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JURISDICTION
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide
appellants' appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Osguthorpe's motion for

summary judgment?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the trial court." Brown v. l/l/e/s, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah
App. 1994) (citations omitted).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Smith's motion for partial

summary judgment?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
3.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Smith's Motion for Summary

Judgment on damages?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal

1

conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
4.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it held, in its December 15, 1999

Memorandum Decision that there was no genuine issue of material fact that title to the
Disputed Property was in the Oral Partnership?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
5.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties and failed to order necessary parties
to be joined, having held in its January 16, 2001 Memorandum Decision, that The
Canyons and Steve Osguthorpe have an interest with respect to the trial court's
September 13, 2000 Memorandum Decision, and are therefore necessary parties, but
failed to grant appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties and,
instead of ordering joinder, "asked" The Canyons and Steve Osguthorpe, neither of
whom are parties to the action, "to file their opposition, if any, to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment within ten days" of the date of the order?
Standard of Review: The determination of whether parties are indispensable
under Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) is an issue of law. The substantive facts are not in dispute.
It is the trial court's legal interpretation of Rule 19(a) which is at issue. This Court
should review those legal conclusions for correctness. See Sacramento Baseball v. Gr.

2

N. Baseball, 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987); Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347,
348 (Utah 1993); West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994).
6.

Issue: Did the trial court err in its May 25, 2001 Memorandum Decision

when it reaffirmed its prior grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App.
1994) (citations omitted).
7.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of

plaintiff when a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Osguthorpe
contributed ownership of the Disputed Property to the Oral Partnership, or merely
contributed the use of the Disputed Property to the Oral Partnership?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
8.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it considered and based its decision, in

part, on an unauthenticated financial statement which is inadmissible hearsay, utterly
lacking in any foundation. This issue was preserved for appeal in the appellants'
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider the Prior
Grant of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

3

Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id..
9.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it concluded that the Dissolution

Agreement explicitly identified the Disputed Property to be property of the Oral
Partnership?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
10.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined, as a matter of law, that

the anti-alienation provisions of the Dissolution Agreement do not constitute an
unreasonable restraint against alienation of the Disputed Property?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
11.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied defendants' Motion to amend

their answer and assert a counterclaim?
Standard of Review: The standard of review of denial of a motion to amend
pleadings is abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 830 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah

4

1992).
12.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined the amount of damages

on summary judgment?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App.
1994) (citations omitted).
13.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined, as a matter of law, that

the Lease Agreement, and the amendments to that agreement, was not, in fact, an
easement.
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court." Id.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953), Estate or interest in real property. See Addendum 3.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953), Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Id.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1953), Partnership property. Id.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Defenses and Objections. See Addendum 4.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings. Id.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19, Joinder of Persons Needed For Just Adjudication. Id.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 54, Judgments; costs. Id.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56, Summary judgment. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This appeal is from the final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court,
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Judge, determining that certain real property, title to which
now is held in fee simple by one of the defendants, D. A. Osguthorpe Family
Partnership ("OFP"), and held in fee simple at times material hereto by D. A.
Osguthorpe, is property of a dissolved oral partnership and that plaintiff ("Smith") is
entitled to receive a portion of the payments received by the defendants from third
parties, pursuant to a contract to which Smith is not a party.1
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Smith sought partial summary judgment on liability and D. A. Osguthorpe and
OFP filed a cross-motion for summary' judgment to have the action dismissed and also
filed a motion to amend the answer filed and assert a counterclaim. The trial court
denied D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's motions and granted partial summary judgment in
favor of Smith and against them. D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP then filed a motion to
reconsider, as well as a second motion for summary judgment and a new motion to
amend. Smith filed his motion for summary judgment to resolve the issue of damages
in his favor and to obtain a complete judgment.

1

That contract being an agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe, D.A.
Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Stephen Osguthorpe, and ASC Utah, Inc. ("ASCU
contract" or "ASCU agreement") (see Statement of Facts for more detailed information).
6

The trial court reconsidered its original ruling, yet denied the second motion for
summary judgment and ruled that summary judgment should be entered in favor of
Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP. D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, in the form of Stephen
Osguthorpe and ASCU, who were parties to the ASCU Agreement that was being
interpreted by the trial court in assessing damages. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, conceded that Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU had an interest in the contract,
but resolved that problem, not by joining them, as the rule requires, but instead by
offering them the opportunity, within ten (10) days, to file a form of amicus
memorandum opposing the summary judgment. Stephen Osguthorpe took advantage
of that invitation and did file such a memorandum. ASCU took the position that it was
not a party and would not do anything in response to the trial court's invitation.
After a hearing, again, on the summary judgment issues, the court reaffirmed its
grant of summary judgment in favor of Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP,
and a final judgment was entered and timely appealed to this Court.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and this appeal
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
General Factual Background:
1.

Prior to 1959, D.A. Osguthorpe, individually operated a sheep and cattle

business. As part of that business, D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of and grazed his

7

sheep and cattle on the real property which is the subject of this action. June 21, 1999
Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 116,1J 2; April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe,
R. 258,H1.
2.

In approximately 1959, Enoch Smith, Jr.2 and D. A. Osguthorpe formed a

partnership, by oral agreement, for the purpose of operating a sheep and cattle
business (the "Oral Partnership"). Id., R. 117, U 3.
3.

Prior to the formation of the Oral Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe owned

fee title to all of the subject real estate. Fee title to the subject real estate was never
transferred from D. A. Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership; rather, Smith asserts that
the 1966 Document constitutes a transfer. Id., R. 117, % 4.
4.

The Oral Partnership was solely the product of an oral agreement

between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe and was never reduced to writing. April 21, 2000
Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 258, fl 3.
5.

When the Oral Partnership was created in approximately 1959, D. A.

Osguthorpe never intended or agreed to make the subject real estate a part of the
assets owned by the Oral Partnership. Similarly, at no time after the Oral Partnership
was created did D. A. Osguthorpe ever intend or agree to or actually make the subject
real estate a part of the assets of the Oral Partnership. D. A. Osguthorpe never signed,
delivered or recorded any deed transferring ownership of the subject real estate from
himself to the Oral Partnership or any other person while the Oral Partnership was in
existence.

April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 258, H 4

2

"Smith," as used herein, refers to both decedent and, where the context
requires, his personal representative.
8

6.

The assets of the Oral Partnership consisted solely of the sheep and

cattle that Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe owned through the Oral Partnership. The Oral
Partnership owned no real property anywhere. Id.
7.

The record below is uncontroverted that the public record indicates the

conveyance to D. A. Osguthorpe of fee title in and to the subject real estate was
recorded on April 1, 1958; no interest in the subject real estate was ever conveyed to
the Oral Partnership; and title in and to the subject real estate remained solely in the
name of D. A. Osguthorpe until 1989, when parcel 1 of the subject real estate was
conveyed to the D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership ("OFP"), and 1998, when parcels
2 and 3 were conveyed to the Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe Family Trust (also referred to
herein as "OFP"). Miscellaneous Report of First American Title Insurance Company, R.
266-271; Warranty Deed conveying subject real property to D. A. Osguthorpe, dated
03/29/58, recorded in the official records of the Summit County Recorder on 04/01/58,
R. 272; April 27, 2000 Affidavit of Mary Katherine Johnston, R. 273-277, and
attachments thereto.
8.

Smith never told D. A. Osguthorpe that Smith intended to make the

subject real estate a part of the assets owned by the Oral Partnership or ever believed
the subject real estate was ever made a part of the assets owned by the Oral
Partnership. April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 258, U 5.
9.

While the Oral Partnership existed, Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe grazed

the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership on a variety of properties;
specifically:
a.

Head of Millcreek Canyon. Before, during and after the Oral

9

Partnership, Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land consisting of
approximately 960 acres, and, until it was condemned by the U.S. Forest
Service, D. A. Osguthorpe always used it as the primary grazing grounds for his
sheep and cattle. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership use this land to
graze the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
b.

Land West of the present Salt Lake International Airport extending

to Saltair. This property was owned by Jimmy Hogle and [first name unknown)
Swaner, consisting of approximately 7,000 acres. The Oral Partnership would
rent this land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
c.

The Swazey permit. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership,

D. A. Osguthorpe owned this land, located on the east side of the Swazey range,
through a BLM permit, and still owns this land consisting of approximately 23,000
acres. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership use this land to graze the
sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
d.

Park City, mouth of Iron Canyon. This land was owned by Enoch

Smith, Jr. consisting of approximately 275 acres. The Oral Partnership used this
land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
e.

Land east of Red Pine. Before, during and after the Oral

Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land
consisting of 20 acres near what is now the home of his son, Stephen
Osguthorpe, and has always used this land as the primary gathering area for the
sheep in the spring and fall. He still uses it for that purpose today.
f.

The East Ranch. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership, D.
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A. Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land east of Park City
consisting of approximately 240 acres. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership
use this land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
g.

The Lower Ranch. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership,

D. A. Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land at Snyderville Basin
consisting of approximately 160 acres. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership
use this land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership,
h.

Bear Hollow. This land was owned by Lou Felton consisting of

approximately 250 acres. The Oral Partnership would rent this land for grazing
the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
i.

Red Pine. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership, D. A.

Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land north of Park City (generally
including the subject real estate) consisting of approximately 564 acres. When
the Oral Partnership used this land, it was only for the purpose of transferring
the sheep and cattle to and from the gathering area east of Red Pine and the
primary grazing lands in Millcreek Canyon, which was over the hill from Red
Pine. The Oral Partnership never used the Red Pine land to graze the sheep
and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership.
Id., R 258-260, fl 6.
10.

An unauthenticated and inadmissable hearsay1965 financial statement,

prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., was offered by Smith to show that the Oral
Partnership owned some unidentified "unencumbered land" valued at $23,711.25. July
8, 1999 Affidavit of Enoch Richard Smith, R. 138-142. Until that document was
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produced in connection with this lawsuit, D. A. Osguthorpe had never seen, approved,
or ratified the statement and under oath disavowed it as any financial statement for and
on behalf of the Oral Partnership because the Oral Partnership never owned any real
property. If the financial statement were somehow admissible, it is, nevertheless,
materially incorrect, in addition to being inadmissable. Id., R. 261, fl 8.
11.

In 1966, Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe determined to dissolve the Oral

Partnership. At that time, Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe verbally agreed that they would
set a date by which either of them could purchase the interest in the Oral Partnership
and assets of the Oral Partnership of the other for $50,000.00 in cash (the "Oral
Dissolution Agreement"). If only one of them had the $50,000.00 on that date, the other
would be required to sell. If both of them had $50,000.00 on that date, they would
determine by toss of a coin which of them would sell and which would purchase. On
the specified date, D. A. Osguthorpe had $50,000.00 and Smith did not. On that date,
D. A. Osguthorpe tendered payment of the $50,000.00 to Smith and Smith accepted
that payment.
12.

Subsequent to D. A. Osguthorpe's payment of $50,000.00 cash to Smith,

and Smith's acceptance thereof in full performance of the dissolution agreement, D. A.
Osguthorpe was informed by O. W. Moyle, Jr. of the law firm of Moyle & Draper, that
Smith desired that D. A. Osguthorpe sign a document to memorialize agreement
relating to the dissolution of the Oral Partnership pursuant to the Oral Dissolution
Agreement. At that time, Mr. Moyle presented D. A. Osguthorpe with a draft copy of the
document (the "1966 Document") D. A. Osguthorpe was informed by Mr. Moyle that the
1966 Document had been drafted by Mr. Moyle at the request of Smith. June 21, 1999
12

Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 117-118, H 6.
13.

Prior to signing the 1966 Document, D. A. Osguthorpe reviewed the 1966

Document with Mr. Moyle and expressed concern that D. A. Osguthorpe was being
required to sign the 1966 Document despite the fact that Smith had already sold all of
Smith's interest in the Oral Partnership and the assets of the Oral Partnership to D. A.
Osguthorpe for $50,000.00, and despite the fact that D. A. Osguthorpe had already
paid the $50,000.00 purchase price to Smith and Smith had accepted payment. D. A.
Osguthorpe also expressed concern to Mr. Moyle about the language contained in the
1966 Document that purported to require D. A. Osguthorpe to share future profits from
the sale or lease of the subject real estate with Smith. Id., R. 118, H 8.
14.

In response to D. A. Osguthorpe's concerns, Mr. Moyle assured D. A.

Osguthorpe that so long as D. A. Osguthorpe continued to use the subject real estate
as grazing land in connection with the operation of D. A. Osguthorpe's sheep or cattle
operation, D. A. Osguthorpe could use the subject real estate in any manner he
determined and D. A. Osguthorpe would never need to pay any monies to Smith, /of.,
R. 118-119,1|9.
15.

With that assurance, D. A. Osguthorpe signed the 1966 Document on or

about November 3,1966. In signing the 1966 Document, it was D. A. Osguthorpe's
understanding that D. A. Osguthorpe would not be required to pay anything to Smith
with respect to the use of the subject real estate so long as D. A. Osguthorpe continued
to use the subject real estate as grazing land in connection with D. A. Osguthorpe's
operation of a sheet and cattle operation. D. A. Osguthorpe intended to continue using
the subject real estate as grazing land in the operation of his sheep and cattle business.
13

/of.,R. 119, U 10.
16.

In drafting the 1966 Document and in his meetings with D. A. Osguthorpe,

Mr. Moyle was representing Smith. Mr. Moyle was not representing D. A. Osguthorpe.
D.A. Osguthorpe was not represented by counsel in connection with the drafting and
execution of the 1966 Document and relied on the representations of Mr. Moyle in
making his decision to sign the 1966 Document, /of., R. 119, fl 11.
17.

The $50,000.00 paid to Smith by D. A. Osguthorpe was equal to or

greater than the then-current market value of all of Smith's interest in the Oral
Partnership and the assets of the Oral Partnership. Id., R. 119, If 12.
18.

At all times since the dissolution of the Oral Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe

has operated a sheep business. From time to time since the dissolution of the Oral
Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe has operated a cattle business in addition to the
operation of his sheep business. At all times since the dissolution of the Oral
Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe has used the subject real estate as grazing lands in
connection with his sheep and/or cattle business in the same manner as the subject
real estate was used in D. A. Osguthorpe's sheep and cattle business both prior to the
formation of the Oral Partnership and after the dissolution of the Oral Partnership. Id.,
R. 119-120,1113.
19.

Since approximately August of 1996, agreements have been entered into

between D. A. Osguthorpe, the Osguthorpe Family Partnership, and Stephen
Osguthorpe, on the one hand, and Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. and its successor,
ASCU, on the other hand. Documents reflecting part of those agreements are as
follows:
14

a.

Lease Agreement,3 dated August 14, 1996, and signed by D. A.

Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe Family Partnership, and Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.
(the "Lease Agreement").
b.

An amendment to the ASCU Agreement, dated July 28, 1997, and

signed by D. A. Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Stephen
Osguthorpe, and The Canyons (formerly Wolf Mountain Resort) (the "First
Amendment").
c.

An amendment to the ASCU Agreement, dated August 10, 1998,

and signed by D. A. Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Stephen
Osguthorpe, and The Canyons (the "Second Amendment").
/d., R. 120,1| 14. These agreements, part of which are documented, are referred to
collectively herein as the "ASCU agreement" or the "ASCU contract."
20.

The ASCU agreement provides, in part, as follows: "Notwithstanding the

rights granted to Wolf Mountain herein, D. A. Osguthorpe shall be permitted to improve
and to use the Property provided that such improvements or use does not interfere with
Ski Lifts and similar structures and runs of Lessee." Lease Agreement, R. 69-70.
21.

The First Amendment requires The Canyons to cooperate and work with

D. A. Osguthorpe and his authorized representative (Stephen Osguthorpe) in
connection with the planning and design of the improvements to be constructed on the
subject real estate by The Canyons. First Amendment, R. 71-72.

3

By using the language of the document, D. A. Osguthorpe does not
concede that it is, legally, a lease. Instead, as argued in Part V below, it is legally an
easement or license.
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22.

Paragraph 4 of the Second Amendment provides as follows:

The Canyons acknowledges that under this Agreement, the August
14, 1996 Agreement and the July 28, 1997 first amendment to the August
14, 1996 Agreement, the Osguthorpe family and D. A. Osguthorpe have
retained the right to use all of the property which is the subject of those
Agreements, as part of their ranch operation (including sheep and cattle)
and to otherwise use and improve such property, so long as such ranch
operation and other use and improvements do not damage the towers
and other facilities constructed on the property by the Canyons (and its
predecessors in interest) and do not unreasonably interfere with the use
of the property in the winter as part of the Canyons' winter skiing
operations. The Canyons agrees that the use of the property by the
Canyons during the spring, summer, and fall, will not interfere with the
ranch operations of the Osguthorpe family and D. A. Osguthorpe.
R. 73-75.
23.

The parties to the ASCU agreement intended the annual payment due

under the terms of the agreement to be paid in consideration of both the use of the land
and services to be rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe. Deposition
of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 40:3-12.
24.

The specific reference to the Osguthorpes participating in the master

planning process was meant to be a reference to the services the Osguthorpes were to
provide. Blaise Carrig Affidavit, fflj 5-6, R. 762-763.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously entered summary judgment, upon the 1966
Document, and awarded damages for one-half of the payments made by ASCU to D. A.
Osguthorpe, OFP, and Stephen Osguthorpe, under the ASCU agreement, despite the
facts that (1) the 1966 Document, itself, is invalid and unenforceable, or, (2) if valid, its
plain terms would not impose liability on D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, and (3) where in
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any event genuine issues of material fact would prevent summary judgment against D.
A. Osguthorpe and OFP.
The 1966 Document is invalid and unenforceable because it does not comply
with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, there was no consideration given to D.
A. Osguthorpe, such that it is not a valid contract, and it constitutes an invalid,
unreasonable restraint on alienation of real estate. D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of
all of the subject real property described in the 1966 Document at all material times.
There is no evidence of any conveyance of all or any portion of D. A. Osguthorpe's
interest in that real property to Smith or the Oral Partnership, at any time. Moreover,
the testimony of D. A. Osguthorpe is uncontroverted that he never intended to and
never did transfer or convey the subject real property to Smith or the Oral Partnership.
Thus, where the 1966 Document purports to convey Smith's "interest" in the subject
real property, Smith had nothing, in fact, to convey. The lack of any definition for
Smith's purported "interest" also renders the document as violative of the Statute of
Frauds and unenforceable.
Additionally, the dissolution of the Oral Partnership had long-previously been
concluded by way of an oral dissolution agreement, as to which all monies owed were
paid and all performance complete. Finally, the uncontroverted testimony of D. A.
Osguthorpe establishes that there was no dispute existing between he and Smith, at
any time, with respect to the Oral Partnership or its dissolution, the settlement of which
might provide consideration for the proffered release in the 1966 Document.
The 1966 Document, in any event, would impose liability upon D. A. Osguthorpe
and OFP only if there were a "lease" of the subject real property (or sale). The ASCU
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agreement is clearly not a lease, but instead, some form of license or easement.
The 1966 Document also provides that D. A. Osguthorpe need not pay anything
to Smith so long as D. A. Osguthorpe uses the subject real property for grazing his
sheet and cattle. The uncontroverted testimony is that D. A. Osguthorpe in fact has
and does continue to graze his own sheep and cattle on the subject real property.
Because the uncontroverted evidence shows entitlement to judgment in favor of
D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP of no cause of action and for dismissal of Smith's
complaint, this Court should enter judgment in D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's favor
entirely. In any event, it is clear that genuine issues of material fact preclude any
summary judgment in favor of Smith on the issue of liability. As to damages, the trial
court erred in its application of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. The
documents reflecting portions of the ASCU contract are shown by uncontroverted
evidence not to be integrated agreements. Instead, the uncontroverted evidence of all
parties to the ASCU agreement shows that the single, annual payment by ASCU to D.
A. Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe (who is not a party to this action) is in
exchange not only for the use of real estate as the writings describe, but also for the
provision of services, particularly by Stephen Osguthorpe (not a party to this litigation)
and that a large portion of that payment is intended to go to Stephen Osguthorpe for
the services he provides. Thus, the trial court's ruling that the entire annual prepayment
was for the use of real estate and calculation of damages based on that ruling is
incorrect.
Because Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU both have material interests, as was
found by the trial court, in the ASCU agreement, the trial court's failure to join them as
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parties was error. Further, the trial court's failure to allow D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP to
amend their answer was an abuse of discretion where summary judgment was
inappropriate.
ARGUMENT

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This case is before this Court for review of the entry of summary judgment in
favor of Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, on a breach of contract claim,
and for review of the denial of D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's motions for summary
judgment.
"A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness."
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, U 9. "Summary judgment is
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson,
Ventulett, Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 673, 2001 UT 54, fi 9 (citing Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
On the record before this Court, the summary judgment entered by the trial court
against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP both on liability and on damages is incorrect based
on the record, and therefore must be reversed. With respect to Smith's motions in that
regard, genuine issues of material fact clearly exist that preclude summary judgment
against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP.
The trial court's denial of D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's motion for summary
judgment is also incorrect based on the record, and must be reversed. The
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uncontroverted evidence in the record supports judgment in favor of D. A. Osguthorpe
and OFP, as a matter of law, because Smith has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
avoid summary judgment against him in the following respects: (1) the 1966 Document
does not comply with the Statute of Frauds; (2) there was no consideration for the 1966
Document; (3) the ACSU agreement was an easement or license, and not a lease,
thereby not subjecting D. A. Osguthorpe or OFP to liability; (4) the 1966 Document is an
unreasonable restraint on alienation; and (5) by the 1966 Document's plain terms, D. A.
Osguthorpe would not have to pay compensation to Smith so long as he continued to
use his real property for grazing, as he always had in the past and, the uncontroverted
evidence shows, continues to occur. These issues are more fully addressed below.
II.

T H E 1966

DOCUMENT IS N O T A VALID CONTRACT. SMITH HAS FAILED TO

ADDUCE REQUIRED EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERATION; T H E EVIDENCE ADDUCED B Y
D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND OFP

A.

ESTABLISHES A N ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION.

There is No Consideration for The 1966 Document.

Smith asserts two items of consideration flowing to D. A. Osguthorpe via the
1966 document, namely, the sale of an Interest to D. A. Osguthorpe in the real estate
that ASCU now pays to use and the provision to D. A. Osguthorpe of a release. First,
as shown below, D. A. Osguthorpe, and not Smith nor the Oral Partnership, was the fee
owner of the real estate at the time of execution of the 1966 Document and, second,
there was no dispute existing between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe, as to which the
release of any claims would provide consideration.
1.

The Oral Partnership was Already Dissolved, And Its Affairs
Terminated, Before the 1966 Document Was Signed.

The uncontroverted evidence in the record establishes that the partnership,
20

established by oral agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe and Smith, had already been
dissolved and its affairs terminated, itself by oral agreement, long before the contract
alleged by Smith (the 1966 Document) was ever signed. First, the 1966 Document
itself recites: "[Smith] and [D.A. Osguthorpe] have heretofore terminated all partnership
relations entered into by them as partners and have discontinued the partnership
businesses, dissolved the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore existed
between them .. . ." R. 7 (emphasis added). Further, although the 1966 Document
was executed on November 3, 1966, see R. 13-14, the 1966 Document establishes the
actual date of dissolution "as of the 17th day of January, 1966, effective January 1,
1966[.]" R. 12, fl 4. The 1966 Document even establishes that notice of that longpreceding dissolution had "heretofore been published as provided by law." R. 12, ^f 4.
The Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed June 21, 1999, R. 116-121, provides testimony concerning all of the details of the
Oral Dissolution Agreement and its performance. Specifically, in paragraph 5 of that
Affidavit, R. 117, D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony establishes that he and Smith orally
agreed to set a date upon which either could purchase the interest in the partnership
and assets of the Oral Partnership of the other for $50,000 cash. If both partners had
$50,000 cash on that date, the partners would determine by a coin toss who would sell
and who would purchase. See id. On the specified date, D. A. Osguthorpe had
$50,000 and Smith did not. See id. D. A. Osguthorpe tendered payment of the
$50,000 to Smith and Smith accepted that payment. See id.] see also Affidavit of D. A.
Osguthorpe dated April 21, 2000, filed April 28, 2000, R. 299-306, U 13 (to same effect);
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Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe, taken November 14, 2000, R. 959, at 21:6-28:20
(describing in some greater detail circumstances described in the affidavits). Thus, the
uncontroverted facts in the record establish that the oral partnership that had existed
had already been dissolved by oral agreement and terminated long prior execution of
the 1966 Document. Nothing was left to do by the time the 1966 Document was
signed.
2.

D. A. Osguthorpe Has Provided Evidence That He Always
Owned Full Fee Title, So Nothing Could be Conveyed to Him
By Smith or the Oral Partnership.

The trial court confusingly characterized D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony regarding
the Oral Dissolution Agreement as representing a "claim" by D. A. Osguthorpe "to
ownership of the disputed property - because of a prior oral agreement with Smith.. .."
Memorandum Decision at 4, R. 205. The trial court then apparently erroneously
refused to consider the already-completed dissolution by oral agreement of the Oral
Partnership, ruling that it was precluded by the Statute of Frauds. See id. However, as
D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony makes plain, the Oral Dissolution Agreement did not in
any way encompass any transfer of real estate - the Oral Partnership never owned
any.
The Oral Dissolution Agreement had nothing to do with any real estate. To the
contrary, D. A. Osguthorpe specifically testified that fee title to the property in question
had been owned by him prior to formation of the Oral Partnership and that he had never
transferred that real estate to the Oral Partnership. See Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe
filed June 21, 1999, R. 117, ^ 4 ("Prior to the formation of the Partnership, I owned fee
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title to all of the Disputed Property. Title to the Disputed Property was never transferred
from my name to the Partnership."); Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000
R. 300, U 4 ("When the oral agreement creating the Partnership was made in
approximately 1959, I never intended and never agreed to make the Disputed Property
a part of the assets owned by Partnership. Similarly, at no time after the Partnership
was created did I ever intend or agree to or actually do so. I never signed, delivered or
recorded any deed transferring ownership of the Disputed Property from me to the
Partnership or any other person while the Partnership was in existence. The assets of
the Partnership consisted solely of the sheep and cattle that Smith and I owned through
the Partnership. The Partnership owned no real property anywhere. [Emphasis
added]").4
It is not only uncontroverted by virtue of D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony that he,
not Smith or the Oral Partnership, was the owner of the subject real estate, the fact is
also proven by the expert testimony of Mary Katherine Johnston, a title examiner, in her
Affidavit, dated April 28, 2000, R. 308-330. Ms. Johnston's affidavit attaches as an
exhibit, an abstract of the Warranty Deed from Tracy Land & Livestock Company to D.
A. Osguthorpe, executed March 29, 1958, and recorded April 1, 1959, with the Summit
County Recorder's Office. See R. 329. Indeed, Smith has specifically and expressly
conceded that Ms. Johnston's title work is accurate. See Memorandum In Support of
Motion to Strike Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe and Mary Katherine Johnston, filed May
17, 2000, R. 421 ("Smith does not dispute the information in the Title Report
4

Thus, the Statute of Frauds does not, as Smith argued, apply to the
already-performed oral agreement to dissolve a partnership that owned no real estate.
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Although Smith alleged that the subject real estate became partnership property by
operation of law, he has never disputed D. A. Osguthorpe's statement regarding the
record title of the Disputed Property.")
There is also additional evidence, in the form of negative evidence, that in fact
neither the Oral Partnership nor Smith, individually, held any real property to sell to D.
A. Osguthorpe (and, also, that nothing was left to do by the time the 1966 Document
was signed). Paragraph 3 of the 1966 Document has Smith agreeing "to execute and
deliver to [Osguthorpe] such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be
necessary to transfer and convey to [Osguthorpe] all of the interests in the partnership
businesses of [Smith] as hereinabove provided . . . ." R. 12, U 3. Had Smith or the Oral
Partnership in fact owned real estate, or any interest in the real estate that they would in
fact sell to D. A. Osguthorpe, Smith could have produced deeds or other documents
purporting to effectuate actual transfers.
The absence of such documents merely buttresses D. A. Osguthorpe's
testimony that he at all times was and remained the owner of the real estate in
question. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that: (1) D. A. Osguthorpe
was the owner of and solely held fee title to the subject real estate at all material times;
(2) the partnership was formed upon an oral agreement and was dissolved upon an oral
agreement which called for the purchasing party to pay $50,000 to the other party for all
interest in the partnership and partnership assets; and (3) the oral dissolution
agreement had been fully performed and the oral partnership dissolved and terminated
long prior to the execution of the 1966 Document.
As has been noted above in the section on standards governing summary
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judgment, Smith must show entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. In
other words, Smith must prove every element of his breach of contract claim. See, e.g.
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) ("On a motion for
summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely,
the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The law in Utah is clear that
the burden of proving consideration is on the party seeking to recover on the contract.
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, ex rel. First Security Bank, 764 P.2d 628, 631-32 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) ("If plaintiff fails to show there is consideration to support the contract,
that party has failed to meet its burden and the contract will be held invalid by the court.
[Citation omitted.] In a contract action in this state, consideration or a legally sufficient
substitute for consideration must be established as part of plaintiff's prima facie case.")
Here, the only proffered evidence of consideration for the 1966 Document is the
1966 Document itself. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, R. 56-80. Smith has conceded at oral argument that the only evidence to
support his claim that he or the Oral Partnership had any interest in the subject real
estate is the 1966 Document. Tr. of July 31, 2000 hearing, R. 956, Tab 2, at 12:17-20
("What we know about is that we have the [1966 Document]. The [1966 Document]
says that Smith has an interest in this disputed property. Well, that's the evidence that
we have."5 The 1966 Document, however, contains no recitals of any previous
5

Prior to this concession at oral argument, an unauthenticated, unaudited
hearsay financial statement, without authentication or foundation, had been proffered
by Smith. See R. 138-142. Smith had argued that the document showed that the
(continued...)
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conveyance by D. A. Osguthorpe to either Smith or the Oral Partnership and the record
is devoid of any such writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds. Examining the 1966
Document, R. 7-14, it can be seen that the 1966 Document itself does not have a
specific recital of any consideration flowing to D. A. Osguthorpe.
Smith points to paragraph 1(g) of the 1966 Document, R. 9-10, as support for his
contention that consideration exists. Paragraph 1(g) contains a promise by Smith,
individually, (not the Oral Partnership) to sell Smith's undefined interest in the subject
real estate to D. A. Osguthorpe.6 It is noteworthy that paragraph 1(g) refers to some
undefined individual interest of Smith, rather than any partnership interest in the
property. Smith's argument that paragraph 1(g) constitutes consideration overlooks a
fundamental problem Smith has. The real property in question and described in
paragraph 1(g) has uncontrovertedly been held at all times by D. A. Osguthorpe, not
Smith and not the Oral Partnership. D. A. Osguthorpe has offered evidence proving his

5

(...continued)
subject real property was an asset of the Oral Partnership because of an ostensible
entry on balance sheet for assets under a line item titled "Land (unencumbered)," with
an ostensible value of $23,711.25. R„ 140. Not only is that document unauthenticated,
unaudited, lacking in all foundation and clear hearsay, which would prevent its
admissibility in any event, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that any assertion that the Oral
Partnership owned land valued at $23,711.25 was false, in that the Oral Partnership
never owned any real property, including the subject real property. R. 303, fflf 11-12.
Additionally, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that he and Smith, through the Oral Partnership,
grazed sheep and cattle over several properties, some owned by D. A. Osguthorpe,
some by Smith, and some by other parties. R. 300-302, fl 6(a)-(i). In fact, the use of
the subject real property by the Oral Partnership was limited to trailing sheep and cattle
and was never used by the Oral Partnership for grazing the partnership's livestock. R.
302, IT 6(1).
6

This argument, as pointed out below in Part H.B.2., itself is invalid
because it violates the Statute of Frauds by its lack of specificity as to what interest is
claimed to be conveyed.
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prior and continuing ownership.
Smith argued to the trial court that the 1966 Document was a conveyance of D.
A. Osguthorpe's real estate to the Oral Partnership by virtue of its "declaration," as
argued by Smith, that the real estate was a "partnership asset" under paragraph 1.
That argument fails for two reasons. First, the 1966 Document, as pointed out above,
itself concedes that the Oral Partnership had terminated prior to the time the 1966
Document was executed (the parties "have heretofore terminated all partnership
relations entered into by them as partners and have discontinued the partnership
businesses, dissolved the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore existed
between them . . . ."). Thus, there was no partnership in existence that could have
received any conveyance of real estate Smith argues was made by the 1966
Document.
Second, paragraph 1 lists partnership assets in subparagraphs (a) through (f) of
paragraph 1. R. 8-9. Then, in subparagraph (g), which Smith relies on, it states "in
addition to the above-described property, [Smith] agrees to sell to [D. A.
Osguthorpe] his interest in7 ihe following described real property . .. subject, however,

The language of the 1966 Document itself, showing that it was Smith,
individually, not the Oral Partnership, that agreed to "sell" D. A. Osguthorpe's own
property to him is significant, because it controverts Smith's argument that the Oral
Partnership somehow owned an interest in the real estate. Before the trial court, Smith
had cited to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5: "All property originally brought into the
partnership stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the
partnership, is partnership property." But that provision does not avail Smith because
he offers no evidence that D. A. Osguthorpe "originally brought" the real estate "into the
partnership" or that the subject real property was "subsequently acquired . . . on
account of the partnership," and the language of the 1966 Document itself that refers to
"his interest" fl| 1(g), R. 9), meaning the First Party, Smith, rather than the partnership.
(continued...)
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to the reservation of interests therein by [Smith] as hereinafter specifically set forth
[Emphasis supplied.]" R. 9. It is noteworthy that the document never seeks to describe
what interest, exactly, Smith in fact holds in the real property that he would be selling to
D. A. Osguthorpe.
To meet his burden, Smith needed to prove a conveyance by D. A. Osguthorpe
to him or the Oral Partnership. It is black letter law that "land owned individually by one
who enters into a partnership cannot become a partnership asset absent some written
agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds." Ludwig v. Walter, 331 S.E.2d
177, 179 (N.C. App. 1985) (citing 60 A M . JUR. 2D, Partnership § 98 (1960)) (stating "we
do not believe the General Assembly intended to abrogate [the Statute of Frauds] by
enacting the [Uniform Partnership Act]."); Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz.
App. 1980); Pappas v. Gounaris, 311 S.W.2d 644, 645-46 (Tex. 1958). See also, 45
A.L.R.2d § 1009, § 5 (1956) (citing cases for the proposition that "land ownership
individually by one who thereafter enters into a partnership agreement cannot become
an asset of the partnership in the absence of a written agreement sufficient to satisfy
the statute [of frauds]); 72 A M . JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 70 (1999) (citing cases for
the proposition that "in order to place in the partnership the title to property owned by
one partner at the formation of the partnership, or to make such property a partnership
asset, the [partnership] agreement must be in writing, the same as any other contract
for the sale of land.").

7

(...continued)
Thus, the precise language of the 1966 Document belies Smith's argument that the
Oral Partnership ever had any interest in the subject real property.
28

Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
is on all fours with this black letter law. Frontier sold a piece of property to Glezos
under a real estate contract. Shortly thereafter, Shire Development (and Albert
Charboneau) entered into a joint venture agreement with Glezos to participate in the
purchase, development and sale of the same property from Frontier. Frontier was not a
party to the joint venture agreement. Shire advanced money to Frontier for the
purchase of the property. Glezos later defaulted on the real estate contract, and,
pursuant to the contract, Frontier forfeited Glezos's interest in the property and retained
the entire amount paid as liquidated damages. Shire sued Frontier under the real
estate contract.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Frontier, ruling, in part, that
Shire had no standing to sue under the contract. On appeal, Shire argued the oral joint
venture agreement constituted an assignment of the real estate contract from Glezos,
which provided it with standing. Frontier responded that if any assignment had been
made, it would have involved the transfer of a property interest, and therefore would
have had to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 223. This Court agreed.
If the oral joint venture agreement were construed to be an assignment of real property,
"it would have to be in writing to comply with the statute of frauds." Id. at 224.
For the Oral Partnership to acquire an interest (any interest) in the real property
owned by D.A. Osguthorpe, the conveyance of that interest had to be evidenced by a
written memorandum evidencing clearly an intent to convey, preferably a deed. See
Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App.
1995):
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that the preferred way to transfer an
interest in land and meet the requirements of the statute of frauds is by
deed. Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007,
1010 (1970) (holding that documents purporting to create profit a prendre
were insufficient under statute of frauds). However, a real property
interest may be transferred through other documents and memoranda
revealing an intent to transfer an interest in real property. Id.. . . Words
that "clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided
the language is certain and definite in its term." Martinez v. Martinez, 93
N.M. 673, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (1979).
Id. Having no interest to "sell" to D. A. Osguthorpe, the promise to sell subject to a
reservation of interest does not constitute anything other than an illusory promise which
will not suffice for consideration, any more than if Smith had promised to sell D. A.
Osguthorpe his interest in the Brooklyn Bridge.
3.

Smith Has Offered No Evidence of Any Belief in an Existing,
Bona Fide Dispute, Such That the Release Would Constitute
Consideration.

The other consideration argued by Smith is in the form of the release of
supposed claims. See 1966 Document, fl 5, R. 12. But Smith has a similar problem
here, as well. The already-completed dissolution of the Oral Partnership and alreadyaccepted payment of the purchase price to Smith had occurred before the 1966
Document was ever signed. The evidence in the record on that issue is
uncontroverted. In the Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000, at paragraph
13, D. A. Osguthorpe testified: "The Partnership was dissolved at that point [when he
paid $50,000 to Smith and Smith accepted] on those terms by our agreement." R. 304.
More emphatically, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that, after the acceptance of $50,000 by
Smith and from that point in time to the point that D. A. Osguthorpe signed the 1966
Document "Smith and I never sued each other, or otherwise engaged in any kind of
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dispute over whether the dissolution was in fact completed. After I paid him the
$50,000, we had no obligations or liabilities to the other. I did not sign the [1966
Document] in compromise of any claim, none had been or was asserted, and I received
no consideration whatsoever for signing. I signed only because [Smith's attorney,
Oscar Moyle] represented that it was necessary to document the dissolution that had
already occurred." R. 304.
The uncontroverted testimony is that Smith received the $50,000 he was owed
by D. A. Osguthorpe, that the dissolution was thereby concluded, that Smith afterward
raised no dispute of any kind, and that Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe remained friends.
See R. 959, at 27:18 - 28:20, 33:22 - 36:4; R. 305, fl 17. Absent some evidence of an
actual existing dispute, there is no consideration offered by any purported release. See
Jones v. Admiral Insurance Co., 195 Ga. App. 765, 765, 395 S.E. 2d 234, 234 (1990).
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that consideration would exist in the form of a
"bargained-for settlement" only where "the parties in good faith believe there is a
disputed or uncertain claim

" England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997).

Since no such evidence exists in this record, there is no consideration provided by the
ostensible release of non-existent claims.
B.

There is No Written Memorandum Meeting the Requirements of the
Statute of Frauds to Show Any Conveyance to Smith or the Oral
Partnership or Any Interest in the Subject Real Estate That They
Could Convey Back.

Smith contends that the 1966 Document, itself, constitutes a conveyance of the
subject real estate from D. A. Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership. Smith also contends
that that same document provides consideration to D. A. Osguthorpe by virtue of
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paragraph 1(g), where Smith, individually, promises to "sell" to D. A. Osguthorpe his
"interest" in the subject real property ("[Smith] agrees to sell to [D. A. Osguthorpe], his
interest in [the subject real property] (emphasis added)." R. 9,1f 1(g).
1.

The 1966 Document does not show a conveyance by D. A.
Osguthorpe to Smith or the Oral Partnership.

Smith contends that the 1966 Document, itself, is a sufficient writing, subscribed
by D. A. Osguthorpe, to convey D. A. Osguthorpe's ownership, because it "declare[s]" it
to be. This argument ignores, however, the absence of any language evidencing any
intent on the part of D. A. Osguthorpe to transfer his ownership. To be enforceable
under the Statute of Frauds, the written memorandum must "stateQ with reasonable
certainly the essential terms of the . . . contract." See Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781
("One of the factors to consider in ascertaining the intent of the parties . . . is whether
the document sufficiently describes the interest granted In a manner sufficient to
construe the instrument as a conveyance of an interest in land."'); 72 A M . JUR. 2D,
Statute of Frauds § 214, at 730 (2001) (citing Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 131
(1979)). The absence of any terms or conditions for the purported transfer by D. A.
Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership, and the complete absence of any language
indicating any intention to make a transfer, grant or conveyance, preclude the 1966
Document from establishing an interest in the subject real property, is not a sufficient to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
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2.

The 1966 Document does not sufficiently describe any
"interest" Smith purported to convey to D. A. Osguthorpe.

With respect to the sale of Smith's undefined and nebulous "interest" referred to
in paragraph 1(g), that, too, is insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. First and
foremost, Smith's apparent contention that his "interest" was fee ownership is
unsupported by any evidence. Thus, the "interest" purporting to be conveyed by the
1966 Document is inadequate as consideration, and inadequate to meet the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds:
Where a seller of land owns only one estate which answers the
description in the memorandum, that must be taken to be the estate to
which the memorandum refers, and a memorandum that contains only a
slight description of such estate will satisfy the requirements of the statute
of frauds. The fact as to ownership, though not mentioned in the writing,
clearly appears to be one of the "attending circumstances" to be
considered by the court in arriving at the true construction of the
instrument.
72 A M . JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 246, at 751. Here, the evidence shows no estate
owned by Smith or the Oral Partnership in the subject real estate sufficient to meet the
Statute of Frauds.
The 1966 Document at no time describes any estate or interest in the subject
real property owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, or, for that matter, the Oral Partnership. It
simply proffers a property description. Thus, the 1966 Document begs the question of
whether the "interest" it refers to is a license, a lease for some term, ownership, a
property interest of any kind, or no interest at all. Since it does not define what is to be
conveyed to D. A. Osguthorpe through the "sale" referenced of the "interest" and
because there is no proof of ownership by Smith of any estate in the real property
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described, the 1966 Document does not meet the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds.
III.

T H E ALLEGED CONTRACT IS V O I D A S A N UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT O N
ALIENATION.

As discussed above, D. A. Osguthorpe was the fee owner of the subject real
estate prior to the creation of the Oral Partnership between Smith and D. A.
Osguthorpe, he remained the fee owner throughout the duration of the Oral Partnership
and continued to be the fee owner following the oral dissolution agreement and its
performance. The provision in the 1966 Document which Smith alleges gives rise to his
right to receive some portion of the annual payment made to D. A. Osguthorpe,
Stephen Osguthorpe and OFP by ASCU purports to reserve to Smith an interest in the
proceeds of sale of the subject real estate, at a price exceeding $20 per acre plus the
depreciated cost of any fencing D. A. Osguthorpe may have done on the property. The
provision also purports to grant Smith one-half of any lease payments received by D. A.
Osguthorpe in excess of $1.60 per acre per year. These anti-alienation provisions of
the 1966 Document are void because they are an unreasonable restraint on the
alienation of the subject real property.
As of this date, Smith's claims under these anti-alienation provisions would have
encumbered the property for over thirty-five years. In 1998, the Michigan Court of
Appeals noted: "[l]t is nonetheless relevant to note that, almost without exception,
conveyances in fee simple requiring the transferee to pay the transferor a percentage of
the price obtained from any subsequent sale have been held invalid." LaFond v.
Rumler, 226 Mich.App. 447, 457 n. 5, 574 N.W.2d 40, 45 n.5 (1998). In LaFond, the
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plaintiff purchased real property from the defendant under an installment sales real
estate contract. An addendum to the real estate contract required the buyer to pay the
seller approximately fifty percent of the amount by which the sales proceeds from any
subsequent sale exceeded the sales price under the original contract. The seller's right
to participate in the excess sales proceeds continued for a period of fifteen years after
the date of the installment sales contract. The Michigan court concluded that the
provisions of the installment sales contract granting the seller the right to participate in
excess sales proceeds were void as "an unreasonably restraint on alienation." Id.
Similarly in White v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 251 A.2d 470 (1969), the court
ruled that the provisions of a will requiring the devisee of real property to share the
proceeds arising from the any sale of that real property occurring within twenty-five
years after the decedent's death where void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation,
noting: "Two of the important objections to restraints are their discouragement of
improvements and their possible effect in respect to creditors of the owner of the
property subject to the restraint." 251 A.2d at 473.
While there appear to be no Utah cases directly on point, Utah courts have
adopted the general rule that unreasonable restraints on alienation are void as against
public policy. See Page v. Page, 15 Utah 2d 432, 433, 394 P.2d 612, 613 (1964) ("The
appellants contend that a restriction on alienation of property for a limited period of time
entered into by an agreement is not void as being against public policy. First and
foremost, this provision was repugnant to the nature of a fee simple, for one of its
essential incidents is the power to alienate. This provision was a disabling restraint in
form (in contrast to a forfeiture provision).").
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Here, the anti-alienation provisions purport to bind not only D. A. Osguthorpe, but
also D. A. Osguthorpe's successors and assigns. Thus, should D. A. Osguthorpe sell
the disputed property and pay Smith's alleged share of the sale proceeds to Smith, the
purchaser of the real estate would, upon a subsequent sale, be required to make a
similar payment to Smith. Moreover, the anti-alienation provisions do not give D. A.
Osguthorpe's successors and assigns any credit for prior payments made by D. A.
Osguthorpe to Smith. Inherent in the anti-alienation provisions of the 1966 Document
are all of the evils attendant to a direct prohibition on the alienation of the real estate, as
a result of which this Court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the anti-alienation
provisions constitute an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of the disputed
property which should be declared void as a matter of public policy.
IV.

SMITH'S CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE 1966

DOCUMENT

REQUIRES N O PAYMENTS TO SMITH S O LONG AS OSGUTHORPE USES THE REAL
ESTATE FOR GRAZING LANDS, W H I C H H E CONTINUES T O D O .

Paragraph 1(g) of the 1966 Document, upon which Smith bases his claim and
which purports to have Smith sell some nebulous and undefined interest in D. A.
Osguthorpe's own real estate back to him, with a reservation of Smith in some interest,
clearly states: "So long as [Osguthorpe] shall use said real property as grazing lands in
connection with his operation of a sheep or cattle business, [Osguthorpe] shall have the
right to the possession and use of the property without compensation to First Party
[Smith]. . . ." R. 9 Here, the evidence is undisputed that D. A. Osguthorpe continues to
use the real property as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or
cattle business. R. 119-120, atfl13. Indeed, when D. A. Osguthorpe inquired of Smith's
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lawyer who was attempting to induce D. A. Osguthorpe to sign the Dissolution
Agreement, Smith's lawyer, Oscar Moyle, expressly told D. A. Osguthorpe "that so long
as [Osguthorpe] continued to use the [subject real property] as grazing land in
connection with the operation of [Osguthorpe's] sheep or cattle operation [Osguthorpe]
could use the [subject real property] in any manner [Osguthorpe] determined and
[Osguthorpe] would not need to pay any monies to Smith." June 21, 1999 Affidavit of
D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 118-119, fl 9; Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000, R.

305, ffl 15-17.
V.

BECAUSE D. A. OSGUTHORPE A N D OFP RETAIN THE RIGHT TO USE THE
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IN T H E

ASCU AGREEMENT,

IT IS EITHER A N

EASEMENT OR LICENSE, B U T NOT A LEASE THAT W O U L D SUBJECT T H E M T O
A N Y PAYMENT OBLIGATION UNDER THE 1966

DOCUMENT.

The terms of the 1966 Document purport to require D. A. Osguthorpe to make
payment to Smith only if D. A. Osguthorpe "sells" or "leases" all or any part of the real
estate. R. 9-10. D. A. Osguthorpe has neither sold nor leased the disputed property,
but has merely granted a non-exclusive easement or license with respect to portions of
the real estate, which does not in any way interfere with D. A. Osguthorpe's historical
and continuing use of the property for grazing in connection with the operation of D. A.
Osguthorpe's sheep and cattle operations. See R. 119-120, fflj 13-15; R. 959 at 70:6-

9, 73:14-17; 89:8-90:21. 8

8

The trial court focused on the use of the nomenclature "lease" and
reference to "lease" payments to come to its conclusion that the grant was a lease.
See R. 207. This approach elevates form over substance and violates general
principles of construction. See Lipson v. Hawthorne Indus., Inc., 148 Ga.App. 751,
753, 252 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1979) ("There is no magic in mere nomenclature, and the
(continued...)
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An easement is defined as a "nonpossessory interest in land of another." Jon
W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land., |[1.01
(1988). The differences between a "lease" and an "easement" have been described as
follows:
In theory, easements are easily distinguished from leases. An
easement is a nonpossessory right to use another's land, whereas a lease
is a right to exclusive possession of another's property for a limited period
of time. In practice, the line between easements and leases is less easily
drawn. Often courts must look behind misleading or ambiguous
terminology to ascertain the true intent of the parties. A statement that
the situation is a "lease" or that "rent" is to be paid is evidence of the
parties' intent, but it does not automatically render the arrangement a
lease.
Id. at |f 1.05. In determining whether a particular grant of an interest in land is a lease
or an easement, "it is critical to distinguish between possession and use." Id. Where
the right to possession of the encumbered property is retained by the owner "with the
right to use it for all purposes not forbidden by the contract and with all the
responsibilities of ownership and control," the right granted by the owner will be
construed to be an easement as opposed to a lease. Baseball Publishing Co. v.
Bruton, 302 Mass, 54, 56, 18 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1938) (Rights granted by the owner
constituted an easement as opposed to a lease even though the document creating
those rights was titled "Lease No.

.").9

8

(.. .continued)
inquiry of the court is always directed to substance and not form.")
9

The same point of distinction exists between a "license" and a lease. See,
e.g., North Avenue Properties, LLC. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 312 IILApp.3d 182,
189, 720 N.E.2d 65, 71 (2000) (distinguishing "license" from "lease"); Keller v.
Southwest North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1998) (same).
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The trial court ignored the uncontroverted fact that D. A. Osguthorpe retains the
right to possession and control of the real estate, retains all responsibilities of
ownership and has never given exclusive possession and/or control of any portion of
the real estate to ASCU, or its predecessor. ASCU has the right to construct and
maintain ski-lifts, roads and skiing trails on portions of D. A. Osguthorpe's real estate,
but D. A. Osguthorpe expressly retains the right to use and improve the property,
subject only to a covenant not to "damage the towers and other facilities constructed on
the property by [ASCU].. . and [] not to unreasonably interfere with the use of the
property in the winter as party of [ASCU's] winter skiing operations." See R. 767, 771.
The rights granted to ASCU do not constitute a leasehold interest, but a nonexclusive easement to use portions of the real estate, subject to the retained rights of
D. A. Osguthorpe. The 1966 Document requires payment to Smith only in the event of
a sale or lease of the real estate. The trial court erred when it concluded that the real
property had been leased to ASCU, and its determination in that regard should be
reversed.
VI.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND OFP O N THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES.

The trial court ruled, on the issue of damages, that the entire annual prepayment
under the ASCU agreement was exclusively for use of real property, and not for
services. See R. 606-607, 952. This ruling was entered despite the testimony of all
parties to the ASCU agreement that the single, annual prepayment was for both use of
real estate and for services. The trial court excluded that evidence under the parol
evidence rule. The parties to the ASCU agreement were unanimous in their testimony
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that the writings were not intended as integrations, however, thereby mandating
consideration of parol evidence. Because only that portion of the payment attributable
to the value of the use of the real estate would be able to be considered in calculating
damages, genuine issues of material fact concerning that allocation precluded the
summary judgment in favor of Smith that the trial court entered.
A.

The ASCU Contract is Not an Integrated Agreement.

As was noted in the facts recited above, the original agreement between D. A.
Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe, on the one hand, and Wolf Mountain
Resorts, L.C., on the other hand, had been entered into orally. Part of that agreement
entailed the use of portions of real estate owned by OFP by Wolf Mountain Resorts,
L.C. As to that part, a written memorandum was executed to allow Wolf Mountain
Resorts, L.C. to record its right to use that real property. That written document
appears at several places throughout the record. See, e.g., R. 518-519. The other
portion of the single agreement entered into that day called for the provision of services
to ASCU by D. A. Osguthorpe, OFP, and Stephen Osguthorpe. The Osguthorpes and
Wolf Mountain agreed on a single price to pay for both the use of real estate and
services, that price being $100,000, due and payable in advance on August 12 of each
year. See Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, dated January 26, 2001, R. 749-760, at ffij
3-8; Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 38:21-39:4.
When ASCU became the successor to Wolf Mountain, a modified oral
agreement was entered into between ASCU, on the one hand, and D. A. Osguthorpe,
OFP, and Stephen Osguthorpe, on the other hand. R. 520-521. The agreement
reiterated the previous oral agreement and added a few additional terms. A writing was
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prepared to reflect summarily some of the terms and to memorialize an additional
$50,000 increase to the annual prepayment, raising it to $150,000 per year. In the
writing prepared by the parties on that occasion, a specific reference was to make to
including "the Osguthorpes in [ASCU's] master planning process," which was meant to
be a reference to the services the Osguthorpes were to provide.10
The testimony of all parties to the ASCU agreement that there is a single annual
prepayment for both use of real estate and receipt of services is uniform, unified and
consistent. For example, Blaise Carrig, the president of ASCU testified:
I'm saying we looked at the total agreement for the total of $150,000 to
include what we talked about in the agreement, but also to include the
other things that we agreed to in the sheep meadow, which were Steve's
consultation, Steve's support, Steve's [ability] to help us understand
things, both politically and in the land use component of the plan, and for
his ability to help facilitate certain meetings, and the many things that I
had talked about earlier in the deposition.
Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 40:3-12. In fact, if ASCU had not obtained the
agreement for the Osguthorpes to assist them in getting permits and approvals, it
viewed the use of the land as essentially worthless: "And we never had a reason to
separate the value of one piece from another. One of the pieces of value is that we
didn't think that the land, without the support [services] in order to get the permits and
the continued, ongoing planning and consultation to make the whole operation and
planning piece work, that the land use was basically worthless if we didn't get the whole
plan to be successful." Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 38:21-39:4.
The Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe confirms that the writing was not intended

See Blaise Carrig Affidavit, fflf 5-6, R. 762-763.
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to encompass all the terms and conditions of the ASCU agreement. Affidavit of
Stephen Osguthorpe, dated January 26, 2001, R. 749-760, at ffif 3-8. See also
Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, R. 761-772, at |f 6 ("Because of the time constraints and the
unique nature of our relationship with the Osguthorpes, the Amendment is very brief
and does not include a detailed description of all of the personal services to be provided
by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual payment of $150,000. Instead it
refers to the parties' obligations to work in good faith and maintain open
communications. ASCU never intended the Amendment to be a complete recitation of
all of the services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual
payment.").
The law is very clear that all such extrinsic evidence is admissible for determining
whether the parties intended documents to be integrations. See Union Bank v.
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) ("Therefore, a court must first determine
whether the writing was intended by the parties to be an integration. In resolving this
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is
admissible."). The uncontroverted evidence here establishes that the parties to the
ASCU contract never intended the writings to be an integration of the entire agreement.
The trial court, by its ruling, impermissibly rewrote the contract between Stephen
Osguthorpe, D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, on the one hand, and ASCU on the other
hand, to something completely different from that the parties actually agreed. Applying
the parol evidence rule in such a fashion to destroy all the parties' own expressed
intentions and agreements between them, which are freely admitted by all of them, is
not permissible.
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B.

Smith, Who Is Neither a Party Nor an Intended Third-Party
Beneficiary of the ASCU Contract, Has No Standing To Assert, And Is
Incorrect in His Assertion of, the Parol Evidence Rule or the Statute
of Frauds.
1.

Statute of Frauds.

In Garland v. Fleischmann, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that a litigant
"is not entitled to raise the defense of the statute of frauds [where the litigant] was not a
party to the contract, nor. . . in privity to a party to the contract." Garland v.
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992). The Garland case quoted with approval,
the following language: "If the parties to the contract as in this case are willing to waive
the requirements of the statute, a stranger to the contract cannot object." Id. (quoting
Zwaska v. Irwin, 52 N.J. Super. 27, 33, 144 A.2d 554, 557 (1958)). Thus, Smith, who is
a stranger to the contract and who is not an intended third-party beneficiary "lacks
standing to raise the . . . statute of frauds." Garland. 831 P.2d at 109.
Moreover, the trial court's ruling that the oral portion of the agreement was not
enforceable due to the statute of frauds is, in any event, legally incorrect. "It is the
intent and purpose of the Statute of Frauds to give to the party to an oral contract
against whom the enforcement of the contract is sought by the other party the right to
avail himself of the provisions of the Statute as a defense to his liability." Id. (emphasis
in original) (citing 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise On The Law Of Contracts § 530, at
746 (3d Ed. 1960)). The Garland court also cited Fielland v. Wemhoff, 249 N.W. 2d
634, 638 (Iowa 1977), for the proposition that "if both parties admit the existence of an
oral contract, it is irrelevant that a stranger objects[.]" Id. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2201(3)(b) (allowing enforcement of contract, for sale of goods, that does not satisfy the
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Statute of Frauds, where the party against whom enforcement is sought admits that a
contract was made).
Further, the undisputed evidence shows the actual performance of the contract
precisely as the parties describe the contract. Stephen Osguthorpe and D. A.
Osguthorpe provided services to ASCU and received the single annual payment and
nothing else in return for those services. Because of the actual performance of
services requested by ASCU under the agreement, ASCU would not be in a position to
repudiate the agreement. See Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) ("Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a court will sometimes apply
estoppel to enforce an oral or implied agreement which has been partially or fully
performed in reliance on the agreement."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (allowing
power to compel specific performance of a contract "in case of part performance
thereof.") It would be highly anomalous to place Smith, a total stranger to the contract,
in a better position than ASCU would be, in Smith's efforts to hide from the court the
services portion of the contract that was not placed in detail in the writing. Cf. Eie v. St
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) ("Though [the contract is]
arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them
the contract meant something quite different, the intent of the parties will be enforced.").
2.

Parol Evidence.

As with the issue of standing to assert the Statute of Frauds, courts have held
that a party lacks standing to assert the parol evidence rule where it is a stranger to the
contract at issue. See, e.g., In re Gatlinburg Motel Enterprises, Ltd. (Newton v.
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Herskowitz), 119 B.R. 955 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (parol evidence rule has reference
"only to the parties to the instrument."); Director of Revenue v. Loethen Amusement,
Inc., 753 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (state's director of revenue who "was
not a party" or "in privity with the parties" "had no standing to invoke the parol evidence
rule."); Nelson v. United Fire Insurance Company of New York, 275 S.C. 92, 96, 267
S.E.2d 604, 606 (1980) ("The inadmissibility of parol evidence to vary the terms of a
written instrument does not apply to a controversy between a third party and one of the
parties to the instrument."); Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1951) (Parol
evidence rule not violated by admission of testimony where party seeking to invoke rule
"was not a party or privy of a party to such written agreement," because "the parol
evidence is not applicable.").
Even if Smith had standing to assert the parol evidence rule as to the ASCU, the
extrinsic evidence offered by D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP is uncontroverted with regard
to the fact that none of the parties intended the writings to be integrated agreements.
Parol evidence is always admissible for the required initial determination of whether a
writing was intended by the parties to be an integration. See Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972):
Whether a document was or was not adopted as an integration may be
proved by any relevant evidence. . . . In determining the issue of the
completeness of the integration and writing, evidence extrinsic to the
writing itself is admissible. Parol testimony is admissible to show the
circumstances under which the agreement was made and the purpose for
which the instrument was executed.
Id. See also Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)
("Before considering the applicability of the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the
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court must first determine that the parties intended the writing to be an integration. To
resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is admissible.") It is also always
admissible to show absence of consideration. See Miller v. Archer, 749 P.2d 1274,
1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Even if a written agreement appears to be completely
integrated, parol evidence is admissible to establish whether there was consideration
for a promise.")
C.

Since the Uncontroverted Evidence That the Annual Payment Is for
Both Use of Real Estate and Personal Services, and a Large Amount
of That Payment Belongs to Stephen Osguthorpe, No Judgment on
Damages Could Property Be Entered on Summary Judgment.

The foregoing discussion clearly establishes that the written portions of the
ASCU agreement were not intended to be integrated. To the contrary, the broader
agreement for the provision of services by the Osguthorpes, and particularly Stephen
Osguthorpe, who has no arguable liability to Smith under the 1966 Document,
establishes genuine issues of material fact in allocating the annual ASCU pre-payment
between use of real property and services. Such genuine issues of material fact
preclude summary judgment.

VII.

T H E TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO JOIN STEPHEN OSGUTHORPE AND

ASCU As

PARTIES IS REVERSIBLE.

D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP moved to dismiss, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(7) because Smith had not joined Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU as parties,
despite the fact that Smith was seeking through his action to affect the contract
between ASCU on the one hand, and D. A. Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe
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on the other hand. Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party
must be joined as a party in an action if:
(1) in his [the third party's] absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined,
the court shall order that he be made a party.
Thus, "an indispensable party is one 'whose presence is required for a full and
fair determination of his rights as well as of the rights of other parties to the suit.'" Call v.
City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Utah. Ct. App. 1990) (Citing, inter alia,
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson Michi Assocs., 728
P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986)). "[B]y requiring joinder of necessary parties, Rule 19(a)
protects the interests of parties who are present by precluding multiple litigation and
contradictory claims over the same subject matter as the original litigation." Kemp v.
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). Rule 19(a) also served to "guard against the
entry of judgments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence."
Id. (quoting Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price Water Users
Association, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982)). The issue in question, therefore, is
whether this action affects the ASCU contract rights of D. A. Osguthorpe, Stephen
Osguthorpe, OFP or ASCU.
The trial court rewrote the agreement in ruling that no portion of the single pre-
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payment was for services.11 That ruling immediately affected the relationship between
all of the parties to the ASCU agreement, including Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU,
who were not parties to the litigation. The trial court made a specific finding that
"although they may not claim an interest in the litigation in general, The Canyons and
Stephen Osguthorpe do have an interest with respect to the September 13, 2000
Memorandum Decision [ruling that the entire annual paymient was for use of real estate,
not provision of services]."12 R. 725. Nevertheless, having so found ASCU and
Stephen Osguthorpe necessary parties, the trial court did not order them joined, but
instead invited them to file memoranda expressing their positions. See R. 956, Tab 4,
at 10:12 -14:5. When garnishments issued, the dilemma created by the trial court's
rewriting of the ASCU contract became real. See R. 957, at 14:1 -17:25.
VIII.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING AMENDMENT.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend the
answer by leave of Court, "and leave of Court shall be freely given when justice so
requires." Rule 15(a) is interpreted liberally to allow the parties to have their claims fully
pleaded and adjudicated. 77mm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1182-83 (Utah 1993).
The primary consideration in determining whether leave should be granted is whether
the parties have had adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
11

Generally, it is inappropriate for courts to rewrite contracts for the parties
thereto. See, e.g., Alfv. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Utah
1993) ("Courts will not rewrite a contract for the parties."); Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d
391, 392 (Utah 1984) ("Neither may a court rewrite the parties' contract.").
12

See R. 606-607, 952.
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786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1135.
Here, after obtaining new counsel, D. A. Osguthorpe sought leave to amend his
answer. R. 331-353. The trial court implicitly denied that motion when it entered
summary judgment. R. 602-608. The trial court did not mention the motion to amend,
but it is certainly an abuse of discretion not to allow amendment upon remand, if one is
necessary. Thus, the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the trial court should have entered judgment in favor of D. A.
Osguthorpe and OFP, and against Smith for the following reasons: (1) There was no
evidence conforming to the Statute of Frauds that D. A. Osguthorpe ever conveyed real
estate to the Oral Partnership or Smith, and the uncontroverted evidence is that he
always maintained fee title in the subject real property; (2) There was no consideration
for the 1966 Document; (3) The 1966 Document constitutes an unreasonable restraint
on alienation; (4) D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP continued to use the real estate for
grazing lands, and are thus not liable under the 1966 Document; and (5) The 1966
Document constitutes an easement or license, not a "lease" that would subject them to
liability.
The uncontroverted evidence establishes D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's right to
summary judgment. If summary judgment were not granted in their favor, however, that
same evidence clearly raises genuine issues of material fact which would preclude any
grant of summary judgment in favor of Smith.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor
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of D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, or, alternatively, the case remanded to resolve genuine
issues of material by way of a trial. On remand, if any, D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP
should be allowed to amend their pleadings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this

\\

day of January, 2002.

)AVID W. SCOFIELD
Attorneys for the Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Appellants' Opening Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this
day of January, 2002, to the following:
Robert G. Wing
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Hardin A. Whitney
Moyle & Draper, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 980911302

Plaintiff,

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

vs .

Court Clerk: Janet Banks
May 25, 2001

PiLII DISTRICT COWT

D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual,
and D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Third Judicial District

MAY 2 5 2001
SALT Jto«J0UNTY

Defendants.

Deputy Clerk

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
a review

of Plaintiff's Motion

additional briefing.

for Summary

Judgment

following

The Court heard oral argument with respect to

the matter on April 16, 2001.

Following the hearing, the issue was

taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the
following ruling.
Plaintiff

filed

this

Complaint

alleging,

pursuant

to

a

Partnership Dissolution Agreement, he was entitled to his share of
proceeds from the Lease Agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe and The
Canyons.

On December 15, 1999, this Court issued its Memorandum

Decision holding Enoch Richard Smith ("Smith") was entitled to "his
share" of the lease proceeds paid to the Osguthorpes by The Canyons
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under the Lease Agreement.
During a subsequent deposition of The Canyons, the general
manager, Blaise Carrig ("Carrig'') , stated that under an oral "hand
shake"

side

perform

agreement

personal

payments.

the

services

Osguthorpes
for

The

were

Canyons

also
in

obligated

return

for

to
the

Carrig, however, admitted there was nothing in the Lease

Agreement that mentioned the provision of these services, nor the
portion of the

(lease) payments that were attributable to these

services.
Based upon the aforementioned, defendant filed a motion asking
the Court to reconsider its grant of summary judgment.

A month

later, plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that all the
proceeds paid under the Lease Agreement were payments for the lease
of real property.
2000,

the Court

In its Memorandum Decision of September 13,
ruled

in favor of plaintiff

holding

that

any

alleged modification of the Lease Agreement to include personal
services

was

(1)

barred

by

the

statute

of

frauds

and

(2)

unenforceable due to the lack of specific terms of the modification
agreement.
Defendant
Failure

to

subsequently

Join

submitted

Indispensable

Osguthorpe and The Canyons).

a Motion

Parties

to

Dismiss

(specifically,

for

Stephen

In January of this year, the Court

held that although The Canyons and Steve Osguthorpe do not have an
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interest in the litigation in general, they do have an interest
with

respect

to

the

September

13, 2000

Memorandum

Decision.

Accordingly, while not granting their motion to dismiss, the Court
allowed Stephen Osguthorpe
their

opposition,

if

("Stephen") and The Canyons to file

any, to

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.
In his opposition, Stephen argues that none of the written
documents executed were intended to be integrated agreements that
encompassed all of the terms and conditions of the agreement of the
parties.

According to Stephen, the payments to be made by Wolf

Mountain, and then The Canyons, were at all times intended to be
both for use of real estate and principally for services to be
provided

by

the Osguthorpes.

It

is

Stephen's

position

the

documents were prepared solely to reflect in writing the right of
Wolf Mountain and of The Canyons to use the certain specified real
property and were never intended to be representative of the entire
contract.

Stephen contends the payment made by Wolf Mountain, and

subsequently The Canyons, was to be for services provided by the
Osguthorpes and such is outlined in the terms and conditions of the
verbal agreement between Wolf Mountain, The Canyons, and D. A. and
Stephen Osguthorpe.
In support of his position, Stephen argues that before the
Court could consider granting summary judgment, it must make a
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finding that the documents were intended to be an integration, and
"to

resolve

this

question

of

fact,

any

relevant

evidence

is

admissible." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024,
1027 (Utah 1995) . As to the Statute of Frauds, Stephen contends it
is not applicable as everyone, but Smith, agreed it existed and,
regardless, Smith has no standing to raise this defense as he is
not a party to the claimed contracts between the Osguthorpes and
The

Canyons.

Further

asserts

Stephen,

the

Court's

ruling

contravenes the U.S. constitutional proscription of the State's
power

to

impair

the

obligation

of

contract.

Finally,

Osguthorpe's position The Canyons is a necessary party

it

is

to the

action and has yet to be joined.1
Plaintiff, in further support of his motion, argues the Lease
Agreement and its amendments are clear, unambiguous and integrated.
Furthermore, asserts plaintiff, the testimony of Stephen and Carrig
is barred by the Statute of Frauds and Parole Evidence Rule.

With

respect to the Statute of Frauds, specifically, plaintiff contends
Smith

is

not

a

stranger

to

the

contract

as

the

Partnership

Dissolution Agreement, which gives rise to the entire litigation,
gives him the right to protect his interest in half the lease

According to the Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, The
Canyons is unwilling to file anything due to the fact that they
have not been joined as a party. This assertion is based upon a
letter from The Canyons counsel to his counsel dated January 25,
2001.

—iflvi
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payments. Accordingly, it is plaintiff's position he is in privity
with the Osguthorpe's with respect to any agreements they may enter
into affecting his right to those lease payments.2
Additionally
contracts

between

asserts
The

plaintiff,

Canyons

and

the
the

"personal

service"

Osguthorpes

are

not

enforceable as they lack definite terms.

Indeed, notes plaintiff,

in

that

his

affidavit

Stephen

acknowledges

the

terms

of

the

personal service portion of the agreement were never agreed upon,
rather, how he and his father divided the payments made by The
Canyons was their business. This argument, according to plaintiff,
lacks merit because defendants owed a duty to Smith, under the
Partnership Dissolution Agreement, to identify the amount of the
lease payments.

It is plaintiff's position the Osguthorpes cannot

be free to simply decide themselves how much to pay Smith.
With respect to the constitutional issue, plaintiff argues
such is specious as courts routinely decide whether contracts are
enforceable.

Indeed, it is well settled the contract clause refers

only to the law of the state and not judicial decisions.

See Rawls

v. Sundquist, 929 F. Supp. 284, affirmed 113 F.3d 1235 (M.D. Tenn

2,?

Privity may be implied by law between the promisor and the
person to whom the consideration belongs, even though the latter
is not a party to the contract." 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts § 425.
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(1996) .3
Finally as to joinder of The Canyons, Smith notes the Court
invited it to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, not a
rearguing of the joinder issue, and since they chose not to file
any memorandum, the issue is moot.
After reviewing the record in this matter, and considering the
additional briefing, the Court remains convinced of the accuracy of
its September 13, 2000 Memorandum Decision regarding plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment.

Indeed, no matter how the evidence is

viewed, it is clear defendant's claim to a side oral agreement is
barred by the Statute of Frauds.

See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3.4

In

this case, the lease between The Canyons and Osguthorpe was for a
term of 28 years.

Accordingly, it was required to be in writing.

Furthermore,

Statute

the

of

Frauds

also

requires

that

any

modification be in writing.
While defendant takes issue with the applicability

of the

3

After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court is
persuaded defendants' constitutional argument lacks merit for the
reasons as set forth by plaintiff.
4

Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be
void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed
by the party by whom the lease or sale is to
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.

—IQff
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statute arguing plaintiff was not a party to arrangement between
the Osguthorpes

and The Canyons, it is clear

the

Partnership

Dissolution Agreement of November 3, 1966 gives Smith the right to
protect his interest in half the lease payments and provides him
privity with respect to any agreements entered into affecting his
right to those lease payment.
Finally,

defendant

seeks to take this matter

out

of

the

Statute of Frauds asserting there has been part performance of the
services.

This argument, however, lacks merit as well for such an

exception only applies to matters involving specific performance of
real estate contracts, which is not the situation in the case at
bar.5
Based upon the forgoing, the September 13, 2000 Memorandum
Decision remains the ruling of the Court.
Dated this

5

^-«* day of May, 2001.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 provides:
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements
in case of part performance thereof.

-ion

Case No. 980911302
C e r t i f i c a t e of Mailing
I c e r t i f y t h a t on the 25th day of May, 2001, I sent by f i r s
c l a s s mail a t r u e and correct copy of the attached document t o
the following:
HARDIN A. WHITNEY
CITY CENTRE I, SUITE 900
175 EAST 400 SOUTH
SLC, UTAH 84111
ROBERT G. WING
CITY CENTRE I, SUITE 900
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH
SLC, UTAH 84111
DAVID W. SCOFIELD
185 SOUTH STATE, #70 0
SLC, UTAH 84111

D i s t r i c t Court Clerk

By:

^gKVvste£

Deputy Clerk

••Individuals with disabilities needing special accommodations during this
proceeding should call (801)238-7300, at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
TDD phone for hearing impaired, (801)238-7391.

APPENDIX 2

Judgment

980911302 0SGUTH0RPE,DAJD

Hardin A. Whitney (3456)
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-0250
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OF JUOvBiniNTS

IMAGED

DATE

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as
Personal Representative of the Estate
of ENOCH SMITH, JR.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an
individual, and D.A. OSGUTHORPE
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.

Civil No. 98-091-1302

:

Judge Glen Iwasaki

On September 12, 2000, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision. Based upon that
Memorandum Decision,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from Defendants

$498,441.02, which includes prejudgment interest through September 20, 2000. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT Plaintiff recover from Defendants daily prejudgment
interest in the amount of $88.53 per day from September 20, 2000 until the date this Judgment
is entered, and that Plaintiff recover from Defendants postjudgment interest at the rate of
8.052% until paid, plus court costs of $ 507.27.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants are
obligated to pay to Plaintiff Plaintiff's share of future lease payments as described in the
Dissolution Agreement dated November 3, 1966 and that this Court shall retain continuing
jurisdiction over this
lis matter.

is
DATED this

£_ day Q^l/zO^

, 2001
BY THE

Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third Judicial Court Judge

APPENDIX 3

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953)
Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than
by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
by writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953):
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be
void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1953):
Partnership property.
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or
subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the
partnership, is partnership property.
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired
with partnership funds is partnership property.
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the
partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the
partnership name.
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name,
though without words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the
grantor, unless a contrary intent appears.

APPENDIX 4

Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
UTRRCPRule12
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Copr. © West Group 2001. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 9-1-2001.

RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS

(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state.
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in
a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days
after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A
motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further

pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or
by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading
sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice
of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it
deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or

objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may
have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed
a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant
may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and
charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and
determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court
shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded
against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer,
instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.

[Amended effective November 1, 2000.]
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RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer,
unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.

(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.
Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable
that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order,
specifying the time therefor.
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RULE 19. JOINDER OF PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION

(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made
a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made
a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action
improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as
described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Non-joinder. A pleading asserting a claim for
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as

described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
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RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS

(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital
of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple Parties. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for Judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by Default. A judgment by default shall not be different in
kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment.

(d) Costs.
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either
in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided,
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the
state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
(2) How Assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after
the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are
claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and
that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of
costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions
of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3) and (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and Costs to Be Included in the Judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
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RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the

action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall
be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him
to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

[Amended effective November 1, 1997.]
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